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This paper examined empirically a scientist's conflict of
interest in Japanese academic entrepreneurships from a
dynamic point of view. Using data on approximately 130
Japanese academic entrepreneurships, we firstly found
evidence that the equity ownership of a scientist is related
positively to a scientist's conflict of interest. When scientists
face the problem of a conflict of interest, the firm has to align
a scientist's interest with that of the firm and induce appro
priate effort from him/her. Our results suggested that the
enhancement of the equity share of a scientist is one of the
effective remedies for solving a scientist's conflict of interest
problem. Secondly, we found evidence that the equity owner
ship of a scientist is negatively related to the stage of firm
growth. This implies that a scientist's conflict of interest
problem is mitigated as the firm advances to the latter stage
of growth.
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1. Introduction
Mustar et al. (2006) argue that there are two remarkable differences
between an academic entrepreneurship and an independent startup.
The first difference relates to the fact that an academic entrepreneur-
ship is developed within a university where the capacity for commer
cialization is not sufficiently developed. The second difference relates
to the fact that an academic entrepreneurship is related to diverse
stakeholders such as managers, venture capitalists, scientists, univer
sity officers, and UTTO (University Technology Transfer Organization)
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officers. Such diversity might cause a conflict of interest among stake
holders and hinder the efficient commercialization of inventions. These
two features imply that an academic entrepreneurship must construct
an efficient corporate governance structure to alleviate conflict of
interest among various stakeholders and overcome the deficiency in
business experience.
Among various stakeholders, we direct our attention to scientists in
academic entrepreneurships. Specifically, we discuss equity ownership
that will mitigate a scientist's conflict of interest. One reason why we
are interested in scientists is that a scientist's resources are likely to be
essential in an academic entrepreneurship. The other reason is that
scientists are generally not active in the commercialization of their
inventions.
The literature points out that scientist play essential roles in the
creation and development of academic entrepreneurships. Specifically,
previous studies argue the importance of the human and social capital
of scientists. For example, a series of studies by Zucker and Darby
(Zucker et al. (1998a, 1998b, 2002), and Zucker and Darby (2001))
show that the most efficient way of utilizing a scientist's human capital
is through the commitment by the scientist to an entrepreneurial activity
as an employee or a consultant. This is because the human capital of
a scientist is difficult to transfer via knowledge spillovers. Murray (2004)
emphasizes the importance of a scientist's social capital in an academic
entrepreneurship. She states that an academic entrepreneurship can
provide access to external resources via a scientist's social capital. In
relation to this argument, Toole and Czarnitski (2007) find evidence that
the reputation of the scientist facilitates external fundraising.
However, some scientists maintain their cautious attitude to
academic entrepreneurship. Indeed, most scientists prefer publication
of their research in comparison with the commercialization of their
invention. Therefore, an academic entrepreneurship needs to construct
incentive mechanisms to utilize a scientist's capacity effectively. Several
studies including Audretsch et al. (2002) and Toole and Czarnitski
(2007) point out the possibility that scientists involved in an academic
entrepreneurship might respond to monetary incentives.
This paper examines the problem of a scientist's conflict of interest
in an academic entrepreneurship from a dynamic point of view, using
data on approximately 130 Japanese academic entrepreneurshlps.
Our results are as follows: (1) the conflict of Interest of a scientist Is a
determinant of the equity ownership of the scientist, (2) the equity share
of a scientist declines as an academic entrepreneurship grows. The
structure of this paper Is as follows. Section 2 presents hypotheses
about a scientist's conflict of Interest In an academic entrepreneurship.
Section 3 outlines the research designs to verify the hypotheses and
discusses the data source, variables, and econometric methods.
Section 4 Interprets the estimated results. Section 5 concludes the
discussions and Identifies remaining questions.
2. Hypotheses
2.1 Conflict of Interest and equity ownership
The roles of scientists In academic entrepreneurshlps vary widely.
The first role Is to provide an academic entrepreneurship with his/her
human capital. According to a series of studies by Zucker and Darby
(Zucker et al. (1998a, 1998b, 2002), and Zucker and Darby (2001)), the
knowledge of a scientist Is characterized by complexity and Implicit
ness. Natural excludablllty of the human capital of a scientist arises
from these characteristics. Therefore, the human capital of a scientist
Is efficiently transferred to the firm via market transactions such as a
contract. Specifically, the most efficient way of transferring his/her
human capital to the firm Is for the scientist to commit himself/herself to
an entrepreneurial activity as an employee or consultant of the academic
entrepreneurship. Similarly, according to Lowe (2002), an Inventor's
personal knowledge accounts for large parts of the technology commer
cialized In an academic entrepreneurship. Therefore, the commitment
of the scientist becomes essential In an academic entrepreneurship.
The second role of a scientist Is to provide his/her social capital
(social network) to an academic entrepreneurship. An academic entre
preneurship can access external resources via a scientist's social
capital. According to Murray (2004), a scientist's social capital Is classi
fied Into a local laboratory network and a cosmopolitan network. The
former Is utilized to complete ongoing projects and the latter efficiently
shapes a firm's embeddedness and allows the firm to tap Into a broader
scientific network^ An academic entrepreneurship can use a scientist's
social capital when the scientist is a coauthor of the firm's employees,
works as a member of the science advisory board of the firm, or is hired
as an employee.
The third role is to absorb requisite knowledge from external infor
mation sources. Audretsch and Lehmann (2006) state that small firms
can select board members strategically to access knowledge resources.
Specifically, small firms can invite as a board member a person who
can facilitate the absorption of knowledge spillovers into entrepre
neurial ventures. A scientist is also expected to function in an absorp
tive capacity in an academic entrepreneurship.
The fourth role is to attract outside financial resources to the firm.
Under information asymmetry, inventors will invest their money into the
academic ventures that are founded by renowned scientists. Therefore,
a famous scientist is expected to facilitate fundraising from outside.
Toole and Czarnitski (2007) point out that among SBIR firms, firms
associated with star scientists perform significantly better than other
SBIR firms in terms of follow-on venture capital funding.
However, most scientists will prefer publication of their research
rather than commercialization of their invention. Some scientists might
maintain their cautious attitude to academic entrepreneurship. Indeed,
Fini et al. (2009) show that an academic's involvement in creating new
ventures is not driven by an entrepreneurial attitude, but rather by the
expectation of generating results that will enhance their academic posi
tion. An academic entrepreneurship needs to construct incentive mech
anisms to utilize a scientist's capacity (human and social capital)
effectively^.
Several studies point out the possibility that a scientist in an
academic entrepreneurship might respond to monetary incentives.
Using data on 20 SBIR firms in the US state of Indiana, Audretsch et al.
1  However, there are situations where remaining in the university is a better strategy than fulltime commit
ment to academic ventures. This is because a scientist can continue to build his/her social network through
a scientific network if he/she remains within the university. See Murray (2004).
2 Lach and Schankerman (2003) suggest that monetary incentive is an effective tool to induce a scientist's
effort in inventive activity. The cooperation of a scientist becomes indispensable when the university inven
tion is licensed to industry. In this process, some kind of monetary incentive is required to induce effort from
the scientist. Jensen and Thursby (2001), Jensen et al. (2003), and Chukumba and Jensen (2006) argue
these issues.
(2002) show that the SBIR program gives university professors incen
tives to create new firms. Similarly, Toole and Czarnitski (2007) find
evidence that the SBIR program facilitates the commitment of a scien
tist to an academic entrepreneurship.
Demougin and Fabel (2007) state that an academic entrepreneur-
ship can provide scientists with appropriate incentives through the
design of an optimal contract. However, it might be very costly to write
the contingency contract in a real world under great uncertainty. As
Audretsch et al. (2009) suggest, one of the remedies for the conflict of
interest of a scientist is to give him/her part ownership of the academic
entrepreneurship^. When the conflict of interest is serious, enhancing
the equity share of the scientist will be effective in mitigating it. Therefore,
we present the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1
The conflict of interest of a scientist is a determinant of the equity
ownership of a scientist in an academic entrepreneurship. Equity
ownership is positively related to conflict of interest.
2.2 Conflict of interest and firm growth
Vohora et al. (2004) state that an academic entrepreneurship
evolves through five growth phases. These growth phases are 1)
research phase, 2) opportunity framing phase, 3) pre-organization
phase, 4) reorientation stage, and 5) sustainable returns. An academic
entrepreneurship should overcome the "critical juncture" barrier when it
proceeds from one phase to the next phase.
An academic entrepreneurship should recognize the opportunity for
commercialization of university technology when it moves from the
research phase to the opportunity-framing phase. In this transition
process, opportunity recognition becomes a critical Juncture. When it
advances to the next phase (pre-organization phase), the commitment
of the scientist is essential for academic entrepreneurship. The impor
tance of the commitment of the scientist has been emphasized in
3 Dalton et al. (2007) summarize the existing studies on the relationship between corporate governance and
firm performance. Recently, much attention has been paid to corporate governance in small firms. Examples
of this are Brunninge et al. (2007), Uhlaner et al. (2007), and Zahra et al. (2007).
6previous studies'*.
An academic entrepreneurship should acquire both human and
financial resources to move from the pre-organization phase to the
reorientation stage. In this transition phase, the social capital of the
scientist contributes to securing human resources and the reputation of
the scientist (halo effect) facilitates project financing from venture capi
talists®. Finally, the most important task (critical Juncture) is to achieve
stable profits when an academic entrepreneurship reaches the sustain
able return phase. To reach this phase, an academic entrepreneurship
must carefully observe market trends and customers needs, respond
quickly to changes in the market, and continuously reconsider its prod
ucts. Usually, scientists do not have enough knowledge or experience
in handling such market-oriented tasks. Therefore, an academic entre
preneurship in this transition phase might rely on the knowledge and
experience of managerial expertise such as venture capitalists.
The firm growth model developed in Vohora et al. (2004) implicitly
terminates in the sustainable returns phases. However, growth phases
in an academic entrepreneurship will lead to further steps such as the
pre-lPO stage and the post-IPO stage. In these stages, managerial
expertise such as venture capitalists will play more important roles than
scientists in overcoming the critical Junctures that are expected to occur.
Here we redefine the growth phase before the sustainable returns
phase as the "early stage" and after it as the "later stage". In the early
stage, both human capital and social capital are essential for over
coming critical Junctures. In later stages, the relative value of a scien
tist's human and social capital decreases and that of managerial exper
tise such as venture capitalists increases. Therefore, the problem of
how a firm should align a scientist's interest with that of the firm will not
become crucial in the latter stage. As a result, an academic entrepre
neurship does not need to guarantee a high equity share for a scientist.
This implies that an equity share for the scientist that is larger in the
early stage will decline in a latter stage. Conversely, the equity share of
a venture capitalist will increase as an academic entrepreneurship
grows. These inferences lead to the following hypothesis.
4 Zucker et al. (1998a, b).
5 Murray (2004) and Toole and Czarnitski (2007).
Hypothesis 2
The equity ownership of a scientist declines in accordance with firm
growth. Conversely, the equity share of a venture capitalist increases
as an academic entrepreneurship grows.
3. An Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis uses data on both academic entrepreneur-
ships and the universities from which these academic entrepreneur-
ships are created. The firm level data are collected from Nikkei Venture
Business/University Spin-Off Firms Guidebook 2005-2006 (hereinafter
the "Guidebook") published by Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha (Nikkei).
The data in the Guidebook are based on the results of an unpub
lished questionnaire survey conducted by Nikkei (the Nikkei question
naire survey). In this survey, the questionnaires were mailed to 844
major Japanese academic entrepreneurships in mid-June 2004. The
questionnaires were collected by early July 2004 and 333 firms
responded to this survey (the response rate was 39.5%). In the end,
204 firms that consented to be listed in the Guidebook were chosen
from the 333 respondents.
The Guidebook reports basic information on firms, which includes
the name of the president, the activity of the firm, the ownership struc
ture, the performance of the firm in recent years, the number of patents
held, and the amount of research and development (R&D).
In addition, the Guidebook provides information on the universities
from which these firms are created. Examples include the name of
university, the involvement of the university with the founding of a firm,
the purpose of the creation of the firm, the current stage of growth of
the firm, the nature of participation of professors and students in the
firm's management, the extent to which a firm utilizes the University
Technology Transfer Organization (UTTO), managerial problems the
firms are facing, and so forth. The Guidebook reports information on
the firm and university as of 2004.
The 204 academic entrepreneurships are broken down into the
following seven industries; information technology (42), medical and
8bio (79), materials (13), machinery (13), services (33), environmental
(10), and others (14).
The university data are complemented with two other data sources.
The basic characteristics of the university, such as the location of
departments, whether it is a public university, and whether it has a
medical school, are taken from University Ranking 2006 published by
Asahi Shinbunsha (The Asahi Newspaper Company). The information
on the cumulative number of firms that the university has created until
2004 is cited from Basic Report on University Spin-Off Ventures 2004
published by the METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,
Japanese Government).
3.2 Variables
The empirical analysis is divided into two steps. The first step (STEP
1) examines the relationship between the ownership and the conflict of
interest of scientists. The second step (STEP 2) discusses the relation
ship between firm growth and the conflict of interest of scientists.
The dependent variable in STEP 1 is the equity ownership of the
scientists in the academic entrepreneurship, which is denoted by the
equity ownership of the scientist (EO). The explanatory variables
include two firm-specific characteristics such as conflict of interest (Cl)
and firm risk (SIZE). This paper also considers the characteristics of
both the university from which a firm has spun off and the industry to
which a firm belongs.
The Nikkei questionnaire survey, the basis of the Guidebook, asks
the firm about various kinds of managerial problems that the firm
currently faces. Examples include a shortage of financial resources, a
deficiency in human resources, lack of know-how, and guarantee of the
market. Among the questions asked, a question exists about whether a
scientist experiences difficulty in wearing two hats as a university scien
tist and as an entrepreneur. In firms that answered "Yes" to this ques
tion, the scientist probably faces a conflict of interest in the academic
entrepreneurship. Based on this inference, we construct a binary vari
able Cl, which equals 1 if the firm answered "Yes" to this question and
0 otherwise. Cl is defined as the measure of conflict of interest.
Agency theory predicts that equity ownership depends on the risk of
the firm. Previous studies based on this theory employ various risk
measures as a determinant of equity ownership. For example, Demsetz
and Lehn (1985) gauge the level of risk by the standard error of the
estimate calculated from fitting the market model, and the standard
deviation of monthly stock market rates of returns. Himmelberg et al.
(1999) use the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of
daily stock prices denoted by SIGMA. We cannot construct such indi
cators because of data availability constraints. Fortunately, according
to Bitler et al. (2005) and Audretsch et al. (2009), firm size is known to
be negatively related to the level of risks. Following their results, we
use firm size (SIZE) and firm age (F_AGE) as proxies of volatility. The
variable SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of total
employees. F_AGE measures the number of years since the firm was
founded (as of 2004).
These studies show that the number of firms created and the perfor
mance of these firms are influenced by various characteristics of the
university to which they are associated®. Specifically, this paper
considers three characteristics of the parent university^.
The first characteristic is whether a university is public. In 2000, the
National Diet of Japan passed the Industry Technology Enhancement
Act, which allows scientists in national universities to participate in
entrepreneurial activity. However, as Lach and Schankerman (2003)
suggest, professors in public universities may still be more reluctant to
engage in commercialization of inventions than those in private univer
sities. We construct the dummy variable PRIV_D, which equals 1 if a
university is privately established and 0 otherwise.
The second characteristic is whether or not the university under
consideration has a medical school®. A university with a medical school
may have an atmosphere that encourages a scientist to commercialize
his technology. We control for the influence of this characteristic using
the dummy variable MS_D, which equals 1 if a university has a medical
6 Rothaermel et al. (2007) and Siege! (2007) summarize comprehensively the results of recent empirical
studies in this field.
7 The studies also examine the effects on the number of new firm created on university characteristics, such
as the quality of university research (Di Gregorio and Shane (2003)), industrial research funds (Powers and
McDougal (2005)), and public research funds (O'Shea et al. (2005)). Although we attempt to employ these
characteristics as regressors, using the data on industrial research funds (scholarship donations, contract
research, and research joint ventures) and public research funds (grant-in-aid for scientific research), we
could not obtain any meaningful results.
8 O'Shea et al. (2005).
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school and 0 otherwise.
The third oharacteristic is how many startups have been created
from the university under consideration. O'Shea et al. (2005) show that
the more new firms a university has created in the past, the greater the
number of new firms that a university is likely to create in the current
period. This suggests that a university with significant experience in
founding new firms tends to accumulate know-how to solve the conflict
of interest of scientists. The variable USO04 is defined as the total
number of academic entrepreneurships that have been founded in
each university.
Lowe (2002) points out that biomedical start-ups and non biomed-
ical start-ups appear to face quite different challenges and experiences.
Therefore, we should control for the difference among technologies (or
industries). We construct dummy variables for the biomedical industry
and the information technology industry to which the majority of our
sample firms belong. BIO_D (INFO_D) equals 1 if a firm is classified
into the biomedical industry (information technology industry)®.
STEP 2 examines how the equity ownership of scientists evolves
through the process of firm growth. The dependent variable in STEP 2
is an ordinal variable that describes the phase of firm growth^®^^^^. The
explanatory variables, EO, the novelty of technology (NV), and implicit
ness of technology (IMP) are considered.
The Nikkei questionnaire survey asks a firm about the current stage
of firm growth. Based on this information, we construct the ordinal vari-
9 All of the firms categorized into the biomedical industry are not born from the universities that have medical
schools. Therefore, we employ BIO_D and MS_D together in the regression equation.
10 Many studies examine empirically the relationship between equity ownership and the performance of the
firm. Dally et al. (2003a, 2003b), and Dalton et al. (2003, 2007) summarize the extant results and report
negligible relationships between equity ownership and the performance of the firm.
11 We also attempt to regress firm performance on EO using 2SLS. Firm performance is measured by the
ratio of total sales (sum of sales in 2003 and 2004) to the total number of employees. In the 2SLS, the instru
mental variables for EO are the variables listed in STEP 1. The coefficient of EO is negative but statistically
insignificant. In addition, the Hausman test could not detect endogeneity between firm performance and the
EO.
12 As the literature suggests, there may be no significantly positive relationship between firm performance and
the EO at the average firm (the mean firm). However, the relationship between two variables might differ In
between the more profitable firms and the less profitable firms. We divide firm performance Into quartiles
(lower quartlle and upper quartlle) and regress firm performance on the EO by using the quantlle regression
method (Eide and Showalter (1998), and Koenker and Hallock (2001)). Unfortunately, these procedures do
not provide us with any meaningful results. For these reasons, we measure firm performance by the more
indirect indicator "STAGE".
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able STAGE, which equals 1 if a firm is currently at the research and
experimental stage, equals 2 if a firm is currently at the commercializa
tion stage, equals 3 if a firm is currently at the preparation for IPO
stage, and equals 4 if a firm is currently at the IPO stage.
Both firm growth and the role of the scientist may be influenced by
the complexity of technology. If the technology is novel, the process of
commercialization may become more complex and take more time.
The development process also needs more cooperation from the scien
tist. This may affect the extent of the conflict of interest of the scientist.
Therefore, we control these effects by using the variable NV, which
denotes novelty of the technology.
The Nikkei questionnaire survey asks a question about whether a
firm is founded based on the technology invented by the university
scientist and is patented by him/her or the university. We assume that
patented technology is usually novel and construct the binary variable
NV. The variable NV equals 1 if a firm responds "Yes" to this question
and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, if technology involves implicit knowledge, the commercial
ization process may require more cooperation from scientists. The
extent of the implicitness may have an effect on the conflict of interest
in the process of firm growth.
The Nikkei questionnaire survey asks a question about whether a
firm is founded based on the results of university R&D that are not
patented. We infer that such research results are not patented because
it is difficult to translate implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge (that
is, patenting). We denote the extent of the implicitness as IMP and
construct the variable IMP, which equals 1 if a firm responds "Yes" to
this question and 0 otherwise.
As we explain later, STEP 1 employs Heckman's two-step estima
tion method (HECKIT) to deal with sample selection bias^^. Because
the dependent variable in STEP 2 is an ordinal variable, we use an
ordered probit model. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table
1, and summary statistics are reported in Table 2.
13 Heckman (1979), and Greene (2007) pp. 882-889.
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4. Estimated Results
We begin by examining the determinants of equity ownership (STEP
1). The estimated results are shown in Table 3. We consider the problem
of sample selection bias before evaluating the results.
According to Borsh-Supan and Koke (2002), the problems of sample
selection bias are divided broadly into two categories. First, sample
selection bias might arise between respondents and non respondents
to a questionnaire survey. If any structural differences exist between
the two groups, the coefficients estimated by using only the data on
respondents become inconsistent. Unfortunately, we could not obtain
the names of the 511 non respondent firms. In addition, we could not
track the 129 firms that did not consent to be listed in the Guidebook.
Therefore, we did not conduct non response analysis for a total of 644
firms.
Second, sample selection bias might occur among the respondents
to the questionnaire survey. This is the case where some respondents
answer but other respondents do not answer a certain question. In our
case, 136 firms answered the question about the structure of equity
ownership, and 36 firms did not answer. If there are any differences
between the two groups, the coefficients estimated by using only the
data on respondents also become inconsistent. We attempt to employ
Heckman's two-step estimation to deal with this kind of sample selec
tion bias. The independent variables in the selection equation include
variables such as F_AGE, characteristics of university, and industrial
dummies^''.
Table 3 reports the estimated results of the determinants of equity
ownership of the scientist. Here, the dependent variable is EG and the
main independent variable is Cl, which indicates the existence of a
conflict of interest for the scientist.
Column 1 in Table 3 shows that the coefficient of Heckman's lambda
is not significant. This result suggests that, in our samples, the second
type of sample selection bias is not likely to be serious.
The coefficient of Cl is significantly positive in column 1. This result
supports hypothesis 1, which predicts a positive relationship between
14 Zucker et al. (1998).
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Cl and EO. When scientists face the problem of a conflict of interest,
the firm has to align the scientist's interest with the firm and induce
appropriate effort from him/her. The result implies that an increase in
the equity share of the scientist is one of the remedies to mitigate the
conflict of interest.
Agency theory suggests that firm risk is positively related to equity
ownership. As we explained above, we employ as a risk measure the
variable SIZE, which is supposed to be negatively related to firm risk.
Therefore, we predict that the coefficient of SIZE is negatively related
to EO. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that the coefficient of SIZE is signifi
cantly negative, as we expect. All characteristics of parent universities
and industries do not show significant coefficients in column 1.
The value of equity ownership is implicitly assumed to be larger
than zero. As Audretsch et al. (2009) suggest, this means that the data
on the equity ownership of the scientist is left censored at zero. Column
2 shows the results when we estimate the same equation as a TOBIT
model. The result in column 2 is almost the same as that in column 1.
The coefficient of 01 exhibits a significantly positive sign, and SIZE has
a significantly negative coefficient. The other control variables are not
significant.
Next, we examine the estimated results of STEP 2. The dependent
variable in STEP 2 is STAGE, which denotes the phase of firm growth.
The equation is estimated as an ordered probit model, and the results
are indicated in Table 4. Hypnosis 2 predicts that the equity ownership
of the scientist is negatively related to the phase of firm growth. The
coefficient of EO exhibits a significantly negative sign in column 1. This
implies that the problem of a conflict of interest for the scientist is miti
gated as the firm advances to the latter stage of growth.
The relative importance of the scientist in the commercialization
process of technology might depend on the characteristics of the tech
nology. The second and third columns test whether hypothesis 2
continues to hold even after several characteristics of technology in the
academic entrepreneurship are considered. In the case where tech
nology is novel or technological knowledge is implicit, the commitment
of the scientist in the commercialization process becomes more impor
tant. A scientist might be required to commit to the firm in the latter
stage of firm growth. In column 2, we add to the equation the control
14
variable NV, which denotes the novelty of technology. Similarly, we
introduce the variable IMP, which is a proxy of technological implicit
ness. The coefficients of EO show significantly negative signs in both
columns. This suggests that hypothesis 2 is still supported even after
technological characteristics are taken into consideration.
In addition to technological complexity and implicitness, the extent
of firm risk might affect growth of the firm. We re-estimate the equation
by adding a proxy of firm risk, F_AGE. The sign and the statistical
significance of the coefficient EO did not change although the level of
the significance decreased.
Hypothesis 2 implies that the contribution of the venture capitalist
might become more essential as the firm advances to the latter stage
of firm growth. In such a case, the firm might have to align the interest
of the venture capitalist to that of the firm. This suggests that the equity
share of the venture capitalist increases as the firm grows. We estimate
the equation with the variable EOVC, which denotes the equity share
of the venture capitalist in the firm. The results are shown in the columns
of Table 5 where the explanatory variables other than EOVC are the
same as the columns in Table 4. As we expect, the coefficients of EOVC
are significantly positive in all columns. These results strengthen the
support of hypothesis 2 that the conflict of interest of the scientist is
mitigated as the firm advances to the latter stage of firm growth.
5. Conclusions
This paper examined empirically a scientist's conflict of interest in
Japanese academic entrepreneurships from a dynamic point of view.
Using data on approximately 130 Japanese academic entrepreneur-
ships, we firstly found evidence that the equity ownership of a scientist
is related positively to a scientist's conflict of interest. When scientists
face the problem of a conflict of interest, the firm has to align a scien
tist's interest with that of the firm and induce appropriate effort from
him/her. Our results suggested that the enhancement of the equity
share of a scientist is one of the effective remedies for solving a scien
tist's conflict of interest problem. Secondly, we found evidence that the
equity ownership of a scientist is negatively related to the stage of firm
growth. This implies that a scientist's conflict of interest problem is miti-
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gated as the firm advances to the latter stage of growth.
We close our discussion by discussing unsolved problems in this
paper. As Uhlaner et al. (2007) point out, it becomes important to
examine corporate governance problems when considering dynamic
aspects of firm growth. This suggests that we need to construct theo
retical models when we consider agency problems in a dynamic context.
Unfortunately, our inferences and hypotheses do not rely on any theo
retical models. Development of theoretical models should be tackled
with the same passion as those of empirical analyses.
Econometric analyses also have to overcome several problems.
First, our conclusion is based on a small samples size (approximately
130 Japanese academic entrepreneurships). Therefore, lighthearted
generalizations of the conclusions are very dangerous. Second, we
measure firm performance by the variable STAGE, which denotes the
current stage of the firm. Because this variable depends on the firm's
subjective evaluation, it is doubtful whether this variable accurately
reflects firm performance.
We also could not measure the variables Cl, NV, or IMP precisely.
These variables might cause measurement errors in the regression
analysis in STEP 2. Furthermore, it is desirable to utilize panel data
when we discuss the reiationship between equity ownership and firm
growth. As in Borsh-Supan and Kdke (2002), panel data might mitigate
simultaneity problems between EO and STAGE, which could not be
overcome appropriately.
Finally, we could not adequately consider the characteristics of a
scientist who commits to the creation and management of an academic
entrepreneurship. As Landry et al. (2006) and Krabel and Mueller
(2009) suggest, such individual characteristics as academic position,
research productivity, or past business experience might have a large
effect on the likelihood of a conflict of interest. We would like to address
these problems in the future when more detailed and accurate data are
available.
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Table 1 Definition of variables
Variable name Definition
EO Equity ownership of scientist.
EOVC Equity ownership of venture capitalist.
STAGE Current stage of firm growth; equals 1 if a firm is currently at
the research and experimental stage, equals 2 if a firm is
currently at the commercialization stage, equals 3 if a firm is
currently at the preparation for IPO stage, and equals 4 if a firm
is currently at the IPO stage.
Cl Conflict of interest: equals 1 if a scientist confronts a conflict of
interest, and 0 otherwise.
SIZE Firm risk: natural logarithm of total number of employees.
F_AGE Firm risk: the number of years since the firm was founded (as
of 2004).
NV Novelty of technology: equals 1 if a firm is founded based on
the technology invented by the university scientist, which is
patented by him/her or his/her university, and 0 otherwise.
IMP Implicitness of technology: equals 1 if a firm is founded based
on the results of university R&D that are not patented, and 0
otherwise.
PRIV_D Private university dummy: equals 1 if a parent university is a
private university, and 0 otherwise.
MS_D Medical school dummy: equals 1 if a parent university has a
medical school, and 0 otherwise.
USO04 The cumulative numbers of academic entrepreneurships that
were created from a parent university (as of 2004).
BIO_D Medical and bio industry dummy.
INFO_D Information technology industry dummy.
Table 2 Summary Statistics
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Variable Name No of CBS MEAN STDV MIN MAX
EO 162 19.82 26.49 0 100
EOVC 164 10.80 19.75 0 94
STAGE 204 1.990 .7225 0 4
C! 204 .1127 .3171 0 1
SIZE 202 14.06 19.85 1 170
F_AGE 204 4.975 4.941 1 44
NV 204 .3922 .4894 0 1
IMP 204 .3775 .4859 0 1
PRIV D 173 .3121 .4647 0 1
MS_D 173 .5491 .4990 0 1
USO04 173 23.68 21.00 1 65
BIO_D 204 .3876 .4883 0 1
INFO D 204 .2059 .4053 0 1
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Table 3 Conflict of Interest and equity ownership
HECKIT TOBIT
Constant 44.76 28.62***
(153.7) (9.526)
01 11.60* 15.49*
(6.324) (8.989)
SIZE -9.568*** 12 11 ***
(2.672) (3.810)
PRIV D -3.356 -2.558
(21.10) (7.589)
MS_D 3.468 .2933
(55.82) (7.557)
USO04 .0900 0.129
(1.157) (.1676)
BIO_D 10.93 13.59*
(16.80) (7.316)
INFO_D -2.110 -2.976
(14.72) (8.553)
LAMBDA -32.33 —
(597.2)
OBS 173 136
Uncensored OBS 136 -
Wald test 23.26** -
LR test - 17.78**
Log likelihood - ^69.3
Pseudo R^ - 0.018
Notes: The dependent variable is the equity ownership of scientist. The values in
parentheses show standard errors. *, **, ***, denote p<0.1, p<0.05,
p<0.01, respectively.
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Table 4 Equity ownership and firm growth: Scientist
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EO -.0086** -.0087** -.0085** -.0078*
(.0039) (.0040) (.0040) (.0041)
NV — .0368 - -
(.2052)
IMP - - .1424 —
(.2068)
F_AGE - - - .0186
(.0224)
PRIV_D .7279*** .7270*** .7293*** .7113***
(.2486) (.2487) (.2487) (.2495)
MS_D .0282 .0291 .0096 .0460
(.2408) (.2408) (.2424) (.2421)
USO04 .01926*** .01929*** 0191*** .0192***
(.0056) (.0056) (.0056) (.0056)
BIO_D .2483 .2439 .2484 .2415
(.2377) (.2391) (.2379) (.2381)
INFO_D .0385 .0392 .0191 .0566
(.2683) (.2683) (.0056) (.2695)
Observations 136 136 136 136
LR Test 26.72*** 26.75*** 27.20*** 27.40***
Log likelihood -117.1 -117.1 -116.9 -116.8
Pseudo R^ 0.102 0.103 0.104 0.105
Notes: The dependent variable is the ordinal variable STAGE. The
theses show standard errors. *, **, ***, denote p<0.1,
respectively.
values in paren-
p<0.05, p<0.01,
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Table 5 Equity ownership and firm growth: Venture capitalist
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EOVC 01461*** .0154*** .0150*** .0156***
(.0054) (.0055) (.0054) (.0054)
NV - -.1431 — -
(.2080)
IMP - -■ .1859 -
(.2062)
F_AGE - — — .0362*
(.0216)
PRIV_D .7336*** .7313*** .7335*** .6924***
(.2486) (.2488) (.2487) (.2505)
MS_D .0514 .0496 .0284 .0857
(.2412) (.2414) (.2428) (.2432)
USO04 .0174*** .0172*** .0171*** 0171***
(.0056) (.0056) (.0056) (.0056)
BIO_D .0695 .0834 .0679 .0631
(.2399) (.2409) (.2402) (.2408)
INFO_D .1295 .1220 .1121 .1487
(.2643) (.2648) (.2654) (.2657)
Observations 138 138 138 138
LR Test 29.61*** 30.08*** 30.42*** 32.36***
Log likelihood -118.1 -117.9 -117.7 -116.8
Pseudo R2 0.1114 0.1132 0.1144 0.1217
Notes: The dependent variable Is the ordinal variable STAGE. The
theses show standard errors. *, **, ***, denote p<0.1,
respectively.
values in paren-
p<0.05, p<0.01,
